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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS P P C E 1 V E D 
OOOOO 
KET NO. J^£l£z£JL^. MAYOi^b 
West Valley City, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v, 
Kenneth H. Rislow, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brlgham Young University 
Law Library 
JRCB 
Opinion 
Case No. 860218-CA 
F I L E D 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Jackson. 
APR 15 1987 
Timothy M. Shea 
D A V I D S O N , J u d g e : Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendant was convicted of the crime of lewdness, a Class 
B Misdemeanor, in the Fifth Circuit Court. The conviction was 
affirmed in the Third District Court. Defendant now raises a 
constitutional issue claiming he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. We affirm. 
On May 4, 1985, Rislow entered a ZCMI store in West 
Valley City. An employee observed Rislow and noted that his 
"private parts were showing for all the world to see" from 
beneath the jogging shorts he was wearing. Three other ZCMI 
employees saw that defendant's genitalia were exposed and one 
of them contacted a West Valley City policeman who confronted 
Rislow. The information for lewdness was signed on May 17, 
1985, and the jury trial was held on December 19, 1985. 
In the rebuttal stage of closing argument, the prosecutor 
made the following statement: 
Counsel finally says he's [defendant] 
guilty of being a slop, not lewdness. I'm 
sorry. It's more than that. It's much 
more than that. Do you want people 
walking into the stores where you shop, 
dressed in that fashion, dangling their 
genitalia and you're going to find them 
not guilty? See, that presumption of 
innocence just went out the window. It's 
now time for you to decide, to decide this 
case. If you want those people walking 
around in your stores where you shop, then 
you're going to find him not guilty. If 
you want to put a stop to it, you're going . v-%> 
to find him guilty. You raised your *hand, *>-><**-
an obligation, you swore that you would 
well and truly try this case. I'm asking 
you now to do what you agreed to do. 
Defendant contends these remarks are improper and 
inflammatory. Rislow's appeal claims that the failure of his 
counsel to object when the remarks were made amounts to the 
denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel. 
We must first determine whether the prosecutor's remarks 
were improper. The appropriate, two-part test is stated in 
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). 
[1] did the remarks call to the attention 
of the jurors matters which they would not 
be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and [2] were they, under 
the circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. 
By the prosecutor's remarks, the jurors were encouraged 
to consider whether or not they personally wanted to observe 
individuals "dangling their genitalia" while they shopped. If 
the jurors would not relish this experience then they were to 
find Rislow guilty. This suggestion goes beyond the evidence 
and should not be considered by the jury. The remarks must be 
labeled as being improper. 
The second part of the Valdez test requires us to 
determine if the jury was influenced by the remarks. In State 
v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1986), quoting State v* 
Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
wrote that conflicting or circumstantial evidence in the record 
would render jurors more susceptible to influence by improper 
argument. But if proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, the 
challenged conduct or remarks by the prosecutor will not be 
presumed prejudicial. Troy at 486. This is the situation 
before us. Defendant cannot claim the evidence properly 
introduced at trial was conflicting as it related to his 
exposure nor can he claim that it lacked strength. Four 
witnesses observed Rislow's exposed genitalia, an experience 
not easily mistaken particularly in the environment of a 
shopping mall where such an event demands notice and 
remembrance. We, therefore, hold the prosecutor's improper 
remarks did not influence the jury to the extent that their 
verdict would have been other than that rendered. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 
1101, 1109 (Utah 1983), established the standard to be applied 
when the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel is raised. That 
Court wrote: 
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendant Mand 
proof of such must be a demonstrable 
reality, and not a speculative matter.w 
(2) A lawyer's "legitimate exercise of 
judgment" in the choice of trial strategy 
or tactics that did not produce the 
anticipated result does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(3) It must appear that any deficiency in 
the performance of counsel was 
prejudicial. In this context, prejudice 
means that without counsel's error there 
was a "reasonable likelihood that there 
would have been a different result." 
Examination of the trial record reveals defense counsel 
did raise objections prior to the remarks of the prosecutor. 
Defense counsel may have believed that any objection at this 
point in the proceedings would only have emphasized the 
negative aspects of the case to the jury. This could have been 
a legitimate exercise of judgment. 
We have already disposed of the possibility of prejudice 
resulting from the prosecutor's remarks. The quality and 
quantity of evidence presented by the prosecutor negates any 
rational belief that but for defense counsel's failure to 
object, defendant would have received a more favorable 
verdict. The trial judge gave his opinion of the effectiveness 
of both counsel when he thanked them for their courtesy to each 
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other and stated that both had done their jobs -extremely well." 
The conviction is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H, Jackson, Judge 
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